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 ABSTRACT 
 
About one third of total EU budgetary resources are spent on implementing cohesion policy. 
Therefore, it is understandable that the European Commission and especially donor states 
(acting for the taxpayers) need to be reassured that their contributions are spent wisely and 
are being used effectively in achieving their stated goal of promoting growth and thereby 
reducing welfare differences throughout the Union. 
Different evaluation methods have been proposed to look at the likely impact of Structural 
Funds interventions ranging from macroeconometric models to case studies. Recently, 
evaluation results based on enhanced growth rate regressions with panel data have received 
wide interest. Ederveen et al. (2006, 2002) are two widely cited works that address the 
evaluation of the effectiveness of cohesion policy using the single equation, panel dataset 
approach. The results support a serious critique of cohesion policy, asserting that its effec-
tiveness is conditional on country characteristics that may be in short supply in many poorer 
member states (e.g., the quality of public institutions), and that cohesion policies should not 
be implemented in the new member states unless the institutional capacities are installed.  
This paper takes a closer look at the Ederveen et al. results, mainly from three directions. 
Firstly, we discuss some issues concerning the general set-up of the database and the time 
period that was used, secondly show that their preferred regression seems mis-specified and 
instable concerning the countries included and the time period used and thirdly discuss in 
more general terms that the use of this methodology in the whole area of policy evaluation 
has been shown to be deeply flawed and to tell us nothing about the effectiveness of public 
policy. 
Our analysis of the methodology and results of Ederveen et al. drive us to the conclusions 
that the policy recommendations derived from this work are unsound, unwise and without 
merit.  In particular, the recommendations concerning the new EU member states should not 
be based on an appeal to the cross-section regressions that are presented in their 2006 
paper. 
In contrast, we propose two other approaches – the macroeconometric modelling approach 
and the microeconomic approach - which, if developed together, hold out the possibility of 
more robust and insightful analysis and conclusions. 
Only by looking deeper into the manner in which EU Cohesion Policy is actually designed 
and implemented, the manner in which national governments operate parallel regional poli-
cies with no reference to Brussels, and by making use of more searching and holistic models 
is it likely to be possible to deliver verdicts on whether or not the EU has a role in this impor-
tant area of integration, and if the answer is “yes”, how that policy can be modified in light of 
the recent enlargements.  Dogmatic conclusions reached in the literature, mainly negative, 
but the point also applies to supportive conclusions, are premature and almost certainly 
wrong.  
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When about one third of total EU budgetary resources are spent on implementing cohesion 
policy, it is understandable that the European Commission and especially donor states (acting 
for the taxpayers) need to be reassured that their contributions are spent wisely and are being 
used effectively in achieving their stated goal of promoting growth and thereby reducing welfare 
differences throughout the Union.1  Beneficiary states and regions, on the other hand, also have 
some incentives to design investment programmes that have optimal effectiveness.  In order to 
reinforce incentives for beneficiaries, their administrations are required, as an essential element 
of access to funding, to evaluate the likely impacts of these programmes on their economic 
performance. 
However, the challenges to be faced in addressing these different demands are daunting.  EU 
cohesion policy is designed in a partnership between the recipient states and the European 
Commission (EC), is applied in a heterogeneous group of the “poorer” member states and in 
some regions of the “richer” member states, consists of a very complex range of public invest-
ment programmes, and is implemented over periods that can last up to nine years.   The in-
struments of cohesion policy are also complex, and include investment in a wide range of types 
of physical infrastructure, provide funding for programmes of vocational education, training and 
re-training, and make available direct aid to commercial businesses for the purposes of promot-
ing activities such as R&D, marketing, management education, entrepreneurship etc.  Some 
aspects of cohesion policy have international as well as national and regional implications, and 
are directed to improve transport and communication links between member states as well as 
within member states. 
In view of this complexity, and the wide geographical coverage of assisted countries and re-
gions, the task of ex-ante and ex-post evaluation of policy impacts and effectiveness is not sim-
ple.  One approach has been to make use of large-scale, complex macroeconomic models that 
attempt to isolate the role of cohesion policy at the margin, i.e., separate from all other external 
and domestic policy influences on the economy.2  However, using the model-based approach is 
not without problems since it means that one must engage in major debates about macroeco-
nomic theory, concerning appropriate types of models, issues relating to micro foundations, and 
the almost intractable challenges to be faced when one attempts to build a first generation of 
such models for the “transition” economies of the new EU member states.  Participants in this 
                                                       
1    One third of the EU budget sound impressively big. But recall that the EU budget amounts to only 
slightly more than 1 per cent of total EU GDP.  But focusing Structural Funds on a limited number of 
recipient countries means that the average rate of assistance expressed as a percentage of recipient 
GDP can be higher, but is usually capped at below 4 per cent. 
2    Two such models are used regularly by the EC: see Roger and int’Veld, 1997 for QUEST (the internal 
DG-ECFIN model); Bradley et al., 2004 for HERMIN (used within DG-REGIO and by some member 
states).  A more recent IMF study of cohesion policy uses the GIMF model of Kumhof and Laxton, 
2008. Introductory remarks  2 
area of research have tended to debate between themselves on matters concerning macroeco-
nomic theory and practice, and the lack of agreement between the modelling groups can be 
confusing and off-putting to hard pressed policy makers and policy analysts who need to arrive 
at robust conclusions concerning the effectiveness of cohesion policy.  Bradley and Untiedt, 
2008 provide a survey of the range of complex issues that arise in the “modelling” debate when 
comparing and contrasting the QUEST and HERMIN models. 
Consequently, it probably comes as a considerable relief to policy makers and analysts when a 
technique is proposed that serves to reduce the task of evaluation of the entire field of EU co-
hesion policy actions to the specification of a “simple” single regression equation, the calibration 
of this equation with an aggregate panel dataset, and the interpretation of the empirical implica-
tions that flow from the regression.  When the results of such an approach are then used to 
support a serious critique of cohesion policy, asserting that its effectiveness is conditional on 
country characteristics that may be in short supply in many poorer member states (e.g., the 
quality of public institutions), and that cohesion policies should not be implemented in the new 
member states, not only is the simple, single equation approach likely to be popular, but the 
conclusions and policy recommendations are certain to command widespread attention and will 
be highly influential in any debates concerning the future of cohesion policy. 
Ederveen et al., 2006 (“Fertile Soil for Structural Funds?”), and its earlier version Ederveen et 
al., 2002 (“Funds and Games: The Economics of European Cohesion Policy”) are the two most 
commonly cited works that address the evaluation of the effectiveness of cohesion policy using 
the single equation, panel dataset approach.  A search on Google Scholar (May 9
th, 2008) pro-
duced an enviable 51 citations of Ederveen et al., 2006 and the same number of citations of 
Ederveen et al., 2002, and the citations are growing rapidly in yet-to-be-published works (includ-
ing Bachtler and Gorzelak, 2008)3. 
The popularity of the above two studies is understandable, since they are well written analyses, 
use a methodology that is simple and easy to grasp, and reach very strong conclusions that 
have implications that are difficult to ignore or misinterpret.  But what is not so easy to under-
stand is the way in which the Ederveen et al. methodology, analysis and policy conclusions 
have been treated by most participants in the debate about the effectiveness of past cohesion 
policy actions and the reform of future cohesion policy.  Little or no discussion about the meth-
odology, the database, its implications and the validity of the results can be found and the re-
sults are often uncritically used and interpreted.   
In our paper we subject the two Ederveen et al. papers to a critical examination and we reach 
some unsettling conclusions.  First, even assuming that the cross-section regression methodol-
ogy is valid, the empirical results presented by Ederveen et al. appear to be so unstable as to 
provide no robust basis for the credibility of their analysis and policy conclusions.  Second, the 
use of regressions performed using data from “old member states” for the period 1960-1995, 
i.e., mainly before the reform and expansion of cohesion policy after 1989, is unlikely to be very 
informative when used to derive conclusions concerning subsequent post-reform cohesion pol-
icy (i.e., for the programming periods 1989-1993, 1994-1999, 2000-2006 and 2007-2013).4  
                                                       
3   The most commonly cited paper is Boldrin and Canova, 2001, which scores 272 citations in Google 
Scholar.  We return to this paper in our concluding section. 
4    We shall see below that the 1989-1993 period was included in the Ederveen et al data set.  But only 
the so called “implementation (or Keynesian) impacts fall fully within the period of the data set.  No 
longer-tailed supply side impacts from the 1989-93 programming period would have had time to mani-
fest themselves. Introductory Remarks 
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Third, the use of these regressions to infer dramatic and extremely negative policy conclusions 
for the new EU member states of the former Communist bloc is almost certainly misleading and 
without any substantial merit.  Finally, the basic empirical cross-section regression approach 
used by Ederveen et al. to investigate cohesion policy effectiveness draws its inspiration from 
an earlier debate on the effectiveness of aid given to very poor, underdeveloped countries 
(Burnside and Dolar, 2000; Riddell, 2007; Easterly, 2003).  Not only is this debate even more 
fractious than the debates that take place between macro modellers, but unfortunately for its 
practitioners, the use of this methodology in the whole area of policy evaluation has been shown 
to be deeply flawed and to tell us nothing about the effectiveness of public policy (Rodrik, 2004).   
We proceed as follows. The next section introduces the basic Ederveen et al., 2006 regression 
methodology and introduces the general set-up of their database. Section 3 reviews their basic 
results and summarizes the principal policy conclusions. Section 4, the main part of our exami-
nation, looks in detail at the Ederveen et al. results and shows that there are several major ca-
veats that need to be entered when the results are interpreted. The final section summarises 
the obtained results and gives some suggestions on alternative approaches to the evaluation of 
the impact of Structural Fund intervention, since the simple single equation approach that treats 
all countries identically is a methodological cul de sac.  
  
2 
EDERVEEN ET AL.:  
THE BASIC REGRESSION METHODOLOGY 
 
 
The basic tool used by Ederveen et al., 2002 and 2006 is a pooled cross-section regression 
equation, motivated by the standard neoclassical framework of Mankiw, Romer and Weil 
(1992), of the form: 
 
              git  =   β0  + β1 ln(yit) + β2 ln(sk,it) +β3 ln(sh,it) +β4 ln(nit+gA+δ) 
                                                  +β5 SFit +β6 CONDitSFit +εit 
 
where the dependent variable and the “standard” (i.e., non cohesion policy) explanatory 
variables are as follows: 
a)  git is the average annual growth rate of real GDP per capita over the period un-
der consideration, for country i and time period t.   
b)  yit is initial GDP per capita in constant 1995 dollars; 
c)  sk,it is the average gross domestic savings rate; 
d)  sh,it is the rate of human capital accumulation; and 
e)  nit is the population growth rate, and is adjusted by the exogenous rate of 
technological progress (gA), and the rate of depreciation (δ).  
  
Two explanatory variables related to cohesion policy are used by Ederveen et al.  The natu-
ral logarithm of 1 plus the amount of Structural Funds as a fraction of GDP is used in the 
equation, indicated by the variable SFit.   Finally, CONDit denotes a conditioning variable, 
designed to capture aspects of the institutional quality of the country, and can take a vari-
ety of realisations, such as quality of institutions, openness to trade, inflation, govern-
ment deficits, etc. 
The cohesion policy data used are at the national level, and concern the main element of EU 
cohesion funding, i.e. the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) which is designed 
primarily to finance infrastructure projects.5  All variables in the data set run from 1960/65 to 
                                                       
5    The ERDF is the main source of cohesion funding.  Other smaller, but not insignificant, sources 
are the European Social Fund (ESF), directed at training, the EAGGF, directed at rural develop-
ment, and the FISM, directed at fisheries. The basic regression methodology 
 
5
1990/95 in seven five-year intervals, and a group of 13 recipient countries that range from 
rich to relatively poor.6 
                                                       
6   The data set includes thirteen EU countries: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Greece, 
Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom). The panel 
data set covers seven five-year periods from 1960-1965 through 1990-1995. An observation in the 
data set thus captures a country's performance averaged over a five-year period.  The data set of Ed-
erveen et al., 2006 is available in www.henridegroot.net/downloads.asp  
3 
EDERVEEN ET AL.: THE BASIC RESULTS 
 
 
Although Ederveen et al. present a wide range of variations of their one equation model 
above, this is done more in a spirit of building confidence around a preferred “standard” ver-
sion (i.e., the variations are carried out for sensitivity analysis) than in any spirit of a deep or 
searching exploration of structural alternatives.   The basic criticism of Structural Funds that 
emerges from the paper is expressed in terms of the above “standard” version.  The se-
quence of analysis followed by the paper can be summarised as follows: 
 
Step 1:   It demonstrates the basic validity of the standard “neoclassical” model, showing 
that key determinants of growth are the initial starting point, the level of investment, 
the standard of human capital, and population growth.  This is presented in column 
1 of Table 1 below and provides the stepping off point for further extension to ex-
amine Structural Fund impacts. 
 
Step 2:   It augments the standard “neoclassical” model by adding a separate term that ex-
presses Structural Fund aid as a share of GDP.  This is presented in column 2 of 
Table 1. 
 
Step 3:   It adds a further Structural Fund term to Step 2, modified with a measure of “condi-
tionality”.  In column 3 of Table 1, the choice of conditionality measure is the pre-
ferred one of “quality of institutions” (see further treatment below). 
 
The basic policy conclusions drawn by Ederveen et al. from this sequence of regressions 
can be expressed in terms of the results presented in Table 1 above, and are fairly damning 
in terms of the asserted ineffectiveness of EU cohesion policy.  The following is a  summary 
statement of their findings.  In the next section we will examine these in greater detail. 
 
i.  The standard neoclassical story of growth and convergence is valid.  Poor countries 
tend to grow faster.  Investment and human capital boosts convergence.  Population 
growth lowers per capita GDP growth (column 1). 
 
ii.  EU provision of Structural Funds in support of cohesion policy, in isolation from all 
other issues, does not improve the growth performance of recipient countries.  In 
other words, Structural Funds, by themselves, do not explain growth differentials 
among the member states (column 2) The basic results  7 
 
iii.  However, for countries with the “good” institutions, and only for such countries, EU 
cohesion policy does enhance growth performance.  So, conditioning for direct 
measures of institutional quality (and other such proxies like “openness”), cohesion 
policy can have robust and significant positive effectiveness, provided “institutions” 
are good enough (column 3) 
 
iv.  Since institutional quality in three of the original four “poor” member states (Greece, 
Ireland, Portugal and Spain) was low prior to 1995, these three states did not benefit 
in terms of augmented growth induced by pre-1995 Structural Funds.7   
 
v.  Applying the “old” EU equation coefficients derived in column 3 of Table 1 above to a 
range of “new” and “applicant” EU states, where the institutional quality is even lower 
than was the case in the original four “old” member states, implies that Structural 
Funds may actually reduce growth rates.  Hence, such funds ought to be re-directed 
towards institution building, and only after success in that task are the funds likely to 
prove effective in promoting faster growth. 
 
 
                                                       
7    Ireland is the “poor” country outlier in terms of its relatively high score on institutional quality, lack 
of corruption, and openness.     The basic results  8 
 
Table 1:  
The basic results8 
 [1] 
Ederveen et al., 2006 
Standard neoclassi-
cal case 
Table 1, column 1 
[2] 
Ederveen et al., 
2006 
“Pure” SF  equation 
 Table 1, column 5 
[3] 
Ederveen et al., 2006 
“conditional” SF  equa-
tion 
 Table 1, column 5 
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8    For ease of exposition, we suppress the wide range of additional diagnostic statistics that accom-
pany the regression results.  These are available in the original paper (Ederveen et al., 2006).  
4 
HOW CREDIBLE IS EDERVEEN ET AL.? 
 
 
We structure our examination of Ederveen et al. under four headings.  First, we comment on 
the nature of the data sample used to calibrate the basic model from which the policy con-
clusions flow.  Second, we discuss the manner in which the tests of Structural Fund impacts 
and effectiveness were executed.  Third, we examine the wider lack of robustness of the 
conclusions, and position this in the generally unsatisfactory use of the technique in the de-
bate of aid effectiveness globally.  Finally, we discuss how Rodrik, 2004 has shown that 
cross-section regression models are likely to be useless as tools for examining policy effec-
tiveness. 
4.1 THE  DATA  SAMPLE 
There has been very little criticism of the fact that Ederveen et al. make use of a data sample 
that runs from 1960 to 1995.  This would not be an issue if it were demonstrably the case 
that the early rounds of Structural Fund aid displayed similar characteristics to the post-
reform (i.e., post-1989) rounds, i.e. there was policy stability.  What was special about the 
reformed Structural Fund aid policies was their goals, i.e., the provision of financial aid to 
assist the design and implementation of policies whose key explicit aim was to transform the 
underlying structure mainly in a select group of beneficiary economies (the so-called, Cohe-
sion or Objective 1 states) in order to prepare them for exposure to the competitive forces 
about to be unleashed by the Single Market and EMU.   
Thus, cohesion policy moved far beyond the conventional Keynesian demand-side stabilisa-
tion role of public expenditure policies, and was directed at the promotion of structural 
change, faster long-term growth and real convergence through improvement of mainly sup-
ply-side processes.  Post-1989, not only was the magnitude of Structural Funds increased 
massively, relative to the level of aid pre-1989, but the administrative, oversight, monitoring 
and evaluation procedures were also dramatically overhauled, and continue to be over-
hauled.  One might even conclude that an additional driving force behind many of these re-
forms was the perceived inadequacy of the pre-1989 cohesion policy framework that Ed-
erveen’s data sample largely covered! 
Only when the Structural Funds were reformed after 1989 did the amount of EU aid become 
significant, expressed as a percentage of recipient country GDP.  For all countries except the 
four so-called Cohesion states (Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain), the highest share of 
Structural Funds was only 0.15 per cent of GDP (in the case of Italy).  Even in the case of 
the four Cohesion states, the shares prior to the 1989 reform and expansion of cohesion 
policy were below 0.6 per cent of GDP.  For the final five-year period analysed in the panel 
dataset, the highest share was for Portugal (1.5 per cent), the share was about 1 per cent for 
Greece and Ireland, and was 0.4 per cent for Spain.  Compared to the role of two ”standard” How credible is Ederveen et al?  10 
neoclassical  regression variables (public investment (sk,it) and human capital investment 
(sh,it) in the regression equation above), these are relatively small policy shocks, trivially 
small for all but the four Cohesion states, and even for these states, trivially small for all but 
the final panel dataset observation 1990/95. 
Of course, it would be unwise to pre-judge policy outcomes on the basis of such casual ob-
servations concerning data.  It is always possible that the pre-reform Structural Funds might 
have had a statistically significant impact on growth and convergence outcomes.  However, 
the small size of the aid injections up to 1988, and the higher injections over the extremely 
short period between 1989 and 1995 that is captured in the Ederveen et al. data sample, 
might reasonably give one pause in expecting too much from so little!  The funding situation 
changed dramatically after 1989, and Structural Funds are now highly significant when 
measured as shares of recipient country GDP.  However, this period is excluded from the 
analysis of Ederveen et al. 
4.2  TESTING FOR STRUCTURAL FUND IMPACTS 
We now comment on the manner in which the role of Structural Funds was tested.  Ed-
erveen et al. presented an initial “standard” neoclassical regression that explains growth in 
terms of four explanatory variables: the initial level of GDP per capita, the public investment 
rate, the level of human capital, and population growth, adjusted for technical progress and 
depreciation (column 1, Table 1).  To this “standard” regression were then added the two 
Structural Fund variables: i.e., the level of EU aid as a share of GDP (SF) and then – addi-
tionally - this variable conditional on an indicator of institutional quality (COND*SF).   
The first variable, in isolation, attracts a negative coefficient, which is statistically insignificant 
(column 2, Table 1).  But when the “conditional” term is added, both SF variables now be-
come statistically significant, the first being negative and the second being positive (column 
3, Table 1).  This is the key finding of the paper and is interpreted as proving that Structural 
Funds only have positive growth impacts if institutional quality is high. 
However, even accepting the methodological validity of the regression9, the correct interpre-
tation of the result of the combined SF and conditional SF terms is to express it as follows: 
 
Effect of Structural Funds   =   [ -0.141 + 0.018 CONDit ]  SFit 
 
The term within brackets is positive for all countries in the data set, and for all years, except 
Greece (-0.042), Portugal (-0.002) and Spain (-0.004).10 Accepting the validity of the Ed-
                                                       
9    Initially we ignore the deeper criticisms of the cross-sectional regression approach advanced by 
Rodrik, 2004.  But we return to them later. 
10  In fact, one can use the bracketed expression to calculate the value required for CONDit, above 
which the aggregate SF impact ceases to be negative and becomes positive.  This value is 7.83, 
and only in the case of Greece is the measured value of CONDit seriously below this value (at 
5.50).  Hence, a more accurate interpretation of the Ederveen et al results is that for EU cohesion 
aid to be effective, ceteris paribus, in the sense of enhancing growth, the level of institutional qual-
ity needs to be above a certain “threshold” value. How credible is Ederveen et al? 11 
erveen et al. regression results, for the sake of argument, the direct implication is that the 
addition of Structural Fund assistance to Greece, Portugal and Spain may actually have 
lowered the growth rate below the no-Structural Fund case.  The reduction would be serious 
in the case of Greece, and modest in the cases of Portugal and Spain.  In the context of a 
static cross-section equation, for this to happen would require the Keynesian multipliers to be 
negative.  In other words, there would have to be a “contractionary fiscal expansion”!  A 
deeper examination of the likelihood of this occurring in Greece, Portugal and Spain would 
require a more sophisticated model that might explain how the addition of Structural Fund 
aid could crowd out private sector activity more than one-to-one.11   
The extension of the results to the new EU member states is even more questionable.  For 
all these states, where data are available, the institutional quality measures are much lower 
than even in the case of the four “old” Cohesion states back in the 1980s and early 1990s.12  
For the new member states, the extensive period of pre-accession programmes prior to their 
joining in 2004 and 2007 was explicitly designed to ensure that absorptive capacity and insti-
tutional quality were raised, so that Structural Funds could be better absorbed and more 
effectively used.  Using the calibrated regression equation, based on “old” EU values drawn 
mainly from the pre-reform era of cohesion policy, guarantees that the Structural Fund im-
pacts will be negative for the new EU member states, since the levels of institutional quality 
are all lower than for the “old” EU Objective 1 countries.  The arguments against using the 
calibrated equation in this way for the “new” member states, and for the reformed cohesion 
policy, are even stronger than the earlier arguments warning of the dangers of using the 
approach for the “old” EU member states. 
4.3  WIDER LACK OF ROBUSTNESS 
The empirical methodology of Ederveen et al. has two even deeper problems.  First, the 
manner in which the role of institutional quality in isolation from Structural Funds was tested 
is unusual.  Second, the empirical results can be shown to be dependent on the observa-
tions for Greece, regardless of using the full or reduced sample that excludes the period from 
1990 to 1995.  
Institutional quality 
Turning first to the separate role of institutional quality, an obvious hypothesis that should 
have been tested prior to examination of a separate role for Structural Funds is the role of 
                                                       
11   Back in the late 1980s a debate took place on the so-called “expansionary fiscal contraction” 
(EFC), as a way of explaining the strength of the Danish and Irish recoveries purely in terms of 
fiscal cut-backs (Giavazzi and Pagano, 1990; Barry and Deveraux, 1995; Bradley and Whelan, 
1997).  Such debates in economics are seldom resolved.  But in this case, the theoretical possibil-
ity of an EFC was shown empirically to be unlikely in practice.   
12    Unfortunately, Ederveen et al., 2006 do not make clear if the institutional quality data that they 
used for the new EU member states represents past values characteristic of the immediate post-
Communist transition period, or contemporary values that represent the post-EU accession period 
and the consequences of adopting the acqui communitaire. How credible is Ederveen et al?  12 
institutional quality as an addition to the simple “standard” neoclassical form of the equation.  
Using as the measure of institutional quality the variable COND (ICRGE80 in their dataset), 
we present the results below in Table 2.13  Adding this variable to the right hand side of the 
“neo-classical” growth equation, the estimate is highly significant, indicating that institutional 
quality, by itself, has an impact on growth performance (Table 2, column (4)).  This is in 
keeping with standard results from economic theory.  Indeed, it can be regarded as a partial 
of test of the implications of the theory of institutions (North, 1990).  Clearly, institutions mat-
ter.  The better your institutions, the higher your growth is likely to be.  This is a finding that 
commands broad acceptance. 
The policy implication of this result is quite specific.  Countries with “good” institutions, as 
proxied by the index, will tend to grow faster than countries with “bad” institutions, ceteris 
paribus.  Of course, bad institutions will not necessarily prevent countries from growing.  But 
there will be a kind of trade off between institutional quality and policy.  Higher values of the 
investment measure (sk), and/or of the human capital measure (sh) would be needed to off-
set lower values of the institutional measure.   
Structural Fund robustness 
Since institutional quality is seen to be an important variable in explaining growth differences 
across countries, a proper starting point for an examination of the SF interventions would be 
the following equation, which contains COND = ICRGE80 as an additional explanatory vari-
able: 
 
             git  =   β0  + β1 ln(yit) + β2 ln(sk,it) +β3 ln(sh,it) +β4 ln(nit+gA+δ) 
                                        +β5 SFit +β6 CONDit SFit +β7 CONDit +εit 
 
This framework has the advantage that we can test the importance of SF interventions in a 
nested framework, within which the Ederveen et al. preferred equation is a special case.14    
But Ederveen et al. did not follow that route, but estimated the above equation without the 
variable COND, which was shown above to be in itself highly significant within this frame-
work. Their equation was re-estimated by ordinary least squares (OLS) and heteroscedastic-
ity consistent standard errors are used to perform individual t-tests to check the significance 
of the individual variables.15 To test for the effectiveness of European cohesion policy we 
                                                       
13    The institutional quality index, ICRGE80, is taken from Sachs and Warner, 1995. 
14   Table 5, column 2 in Ederveen et al. contains results for this specification. But it is only used to 
show that the variable COND is not significant. They conclude (p.29): “The results, …, clearly 
show that it is not insititutional quality itself that matters.” But they never tested COND separately 
as we did in the preceding section.  
15   Across countries within a panel, different distributions, i.e. different (conditional) means and stan-
dard deviations, for the variables can be expected. The parameter estimates are unbiased if there 
is heteroscedasticity, but the estimated standard errors of the regression coefficients are biased.  
To correct this bias, different solutions have been proposed, such as. Asteriou, Hall (2007, p. 100-
26).  How credible is Ederveen et al? 13 
investigated the joint significance of the variables SF and COND*SF, i.e  β5=0 and β6=0 by 
using a F-Test.  Table 2 presents the results. 
 
Table 2:  
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Adjusted R2  0.51  0.51  0.44  0.49 
Number of panel observa-
tions 
91 91  84  91 
Joint test of significance  
(SF variables)  
      
Wald-Test 11.91*** 









Note :   The significance of the estimated parameters is indicated by asterisks, and ***, **, * denote 
significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level, respectively.  T-Statistics are calculated using 
heteroscedasticity consistent errors, the figure in [] denotes the probability of a rejection of the 
Null hypothesis  that β5  and β6 are jointly zero. 
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Column (1) shows the original estimates of the preferred equation by Ederveen et al.; col-
umn (2) introduces our re-estimated results from the database that was published by Ed-
erveen et al.; and column (3) reports our results for a reduced sample, i.e. Greece was ex-
cluded from the database.  Column (4) reports the results of adding COND as a separate 
variable in the standard neoclassical equation (discussed above). 
In the case of column (2), the re-estimation shows that only very small differences for the 
coefficients of the explanatory variables (as between column (1) and column (2)) are observ-
able, where only the intercept terms are somewhat different. The individual coefficients con-
cerning the SF are in line with Ederveen et al., showing a negative impact of Structural 
Funds by themselves (SF) and a positive coefficient for the interaction of Structural Funds 
and institutional quality (SF*COND).  The F-test signals that both variables are jointly highly 
significant.  
In the case of column (3), we show that a robustness check that excludes Greece – one of 
the main recipients of cohesion policy aid -  from the sample produces a totally different re-
sult for the Structural Fund impacts from the preferred Ederveen case (column (1)).  No indi-
vidual coefficient of the impact of the SF or the interaction variable SF*COND is significant, 
nor are they jointly significant. This shows that the Ederveen et al. results are sensitive to a 
single country and are not robust to changes concerning the countries included, nor the time 
period investigated as can also be shown. The conclusions drawn by Ederveen et al. do not 
pass a robustness check that goes beyond their own reported robustness investigations and 
the equation seems mis-specified since the important variable that acts as a proxy for institu-
tional quality is not part of the preferred specification.    
Our conclusion from this robustness analysis is disturbing.  The specification of Ederveen et 
al appears to be very sensitive to the exact specification used, and to the time periods ana-
lysed.  Whereas they analysed a wide range of conditioning variables in their exploration of 
robustness, they did not explore different specifications, and did not examine sensitivity to 
the length of the data set or the countries included, except in the case of Ireland.16 
The research literature on the question of the sensitivity and stability of cross section regres-
sions used to explore the effectiveness of aid to less developed countries is voluminous, and 
reaches conclusions similar to ours.  Roodman, 2004 is a recent exhaustive examination of 
the area.  The implications are that one cannot, and should not,  base policy conclusions on 
these kinds of results.   
4.4  A DEEPER METHODOLOGICAL PROBLEM17 
We have examined issues in the Ederveen et al. paper that concern the data set, how Struc-
tural Fund impacts are tested, and empirical robustness.  For the purposes of this examina-
tion, we made the assumption that the basic cross-section growth regression framework was 
a valid methodology for investigating policy effectiveness.  As the empirical growth literature 
                                                       
16    In the case of applications to the debate on aid effectiveness, Easterly, 2004 emphasises that 
results are driven by outliers which represent instances of extremely “bad” policies.  Greece may 
be such an outlier in the case of EU cohesion policy, but a more detailed examination would be 
needed before proposing such an interpretation. 
17    This material draws heavily from Rodrik, 2004. How credible is Ederveen et al? 15 
has grown, so has the critical evaluation of it.  There is by now a wide-ranging discussion of the 
shortcomings of growth regressions, which focuses on problems relating to: parameter het-
erogeneity, outliers, omitted variables, model uncertainty, measurement error and endogene-
ity (Roodman, 2004).  However, the panel regression technique has also been shown by 
Dani Rodrik to provide little or nothing by way of understanding of policy impacts (Rodrik, 
2004).   
In the case of cross-section regressions, policy endogeneity is not just an annoying econo-
metric nuisance, but typically an integral part of the null hypothesis that is being tested.  
Rodrik concludes that: 
“As long as policy interventions are not random and their presence responds to 
unobservables, regressing an economic performance variable on policies is uninforma-
tive about the degree to which market failures exist, the extent to which policy inter-
ventions are targeted on them, the effectiveness with which government policies 
are deployed, or the extent to which policy interventions are used to create and di-
vert rents for political purposes.”  
The trouble with instrumental variables (IV) is twofold.  First, in the area of inquiry concerning 
the determinants of growth, it is hard to find credible instruments which satisfy both the exo-
geneity and exclusion requirements.  Growth theory is so broad and encompassing that it is 
always possible to find a story about why an exogenous variable belongs as a regressor in 
the second-stage of the estimation (therefore making it invalid as an instrument). Plausible 
instruments are very few indeed.  
But an equally important limitation on IV is that what one is typically interested in knowing is 
the impact of purposeful policy action.  We want the answer to the question: when govern-
ments have tried to achieve this or that objective, how successful have they been at it?  The 
exogenous component of policy, even if excludable from the second-stage of IV, can help us 
answer a different question: what has been the impact of policy interventions that govern-
ments did not adopt purposefully, but it does not answer questions concerning “purposeful” 
actions. 
Rodrik suggests that a first step in the right direction is to take the theories that motivate 
empirical analyses more seriously.  Failure to undertake meaningful tests often derives from 
a failure to fully specify the theoretical model(s) being put to the test.  For example, if one is 
testing the null hypothesis that governments are acting in the public interest, one needs to 
specify a model in which governments do precisely that, come clean about what one as-
sumes is and is not observable, and inquire whether the empirical implications of such a 
model are consistent with the data.  If one is testing this view against the alternative that they 
are motivated by private/political interests, one needs to be clear about the distinct predic-
tions the two models make for the data.  Furthermore, whether or not the alternative theories 
generate different predictions, one needs to look for direct evidence about the channels 
through which policies are hypothesized to operate.  However, this advice is seldom fol-
lowed, and Rodrik concludes: 
“These (suggestions) seem like standard good practice, but it is clear that the 
bulk of the cross-national growth literature proceeds in a different manner, as-
suming that it is enough to plug a policy variable in a regression (while perhaps 
making an honest attempt at instrumenting it) in order to answer a whole series 
of questions about the effectiveness of policy and the motives of governments.”  
5 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
 
Our analysis of the methodology and results of Ederveen et al. drive us to the conclusions 
that the policy recommendations derived from this work are unsound, unwise and without 
merit.  In particular, the recommendations concerning the new EU member states should not 
be based on an appeal to the cross-section regressions that are presented in the paper. 
Let us recall the two most important policy conclusions in Ederveen et al.: 
i. “Building on a standard neoclassical growth framework, we find that European sup-
port as such did not improve the countries’ growth performance.  However, we find 
evidence that it enhances growth in countries with the ‘right’ institutions”. 
 
ii. “So, the European policy to promote regional growth is only conditionally effective. 
This finding bears considerable consequences for the (re-)design of the EU cohe-
sion policy in light of the enlargement of the EU: the funds are to be allocated toward 
institution building in the first instance. Once the institutions are of a sufficient qual-
ity, the funds may be effective in stimulating (catching-up) growth”. 
 
A revised statement of policy conclusions, based on our critique, might run as follows: 
 
a)  Building on a standard neoclassical growth framework, we find that the quality of insti-
tutions, on its own, has a highly significant impact on growth. 
 
b)  In a cross section regression containing all four “standard” neoclassical explanatory 
variables (initial GDP level, investment, human capital and adjusted population), plus 
institutional quality, there appears to be no separate robust impact of the pre-reform 
Structural Funds on growth.  But one should not rush to the conclusion that Structural 
Funds are “ineffective”, since the pre-reform funds were relatively insignificant, com-
pared to the magnitude of the other driving forces of growth. 
 
c)  The implications of the Ederveen et al work for the post-reform impacts of Structural 
Funds cannot be inferred from their data sample.  A fortiori, nothing can be inferred 
concerning the role of Structural Funds on the new EU member states. 
 
If the simple cross-section regression approach is to be dismissed, are there better ways to 
evaluate the effectiveness of Structural Funds?  One approach is that taken by Boldrin and 
Canova, 2001, the most commonly cited paper in the area of evaluation of EU Cohesion 
Policy (see footnote 3 above).  Unlike Ederveen et al., 2006, this paper uses an eclectic 
methodological approach, based on a blend of theory and data examination, against the Summary and conclusions 17 
general background of the growth regression/convergence literature.  Their critique of EU 
Cohesion Policy is even more damning than Ederveen et al: 
 
“Regional and policies serve mostly a redistributional purpose, motivated by the 
nature of the political equilibria upon which the European Union is built” (p. 206) 
 
If one defines EU Cohesion Policy in terms of seeking equity between regions rather than 
between countries, observations as well as common sense tell one that this policy will not 
only fail, but will probably be counter productive.  If EU Cohesion Policy had been designed 
and implemented purely at the regional level within member states, with rapid moves to-
wards regional equity as a goal, then it has not been a success.  Rich, poor and middling 
regions coexist with each other, in the past, today, and probably in the future. 
But although the rhetoric of the EU cohesion objective, as expressed in the Treaties, seeks 
equity at all levels within the Union, in practice EU Cohesion Policy is designed and adminis-
tered by national governments in association with Brussels oversight, and directs investment 
to regions in a manner that seeks to balance the twin goals of efficiency and equity.  Thus, it 
would be a waste of resources to build a motorway through a poor region, unless it con-
nected large conurbations in adjoining regions.  A more appropriate type of policy for the 
poor region might be to make use of the Social Fund element to increase human capital in 
poorer – usually rural – regions.  This would facilitate outward migration in early stages of 
development, with the prospects of return migration as the congestion-driven spillover from 
richer regions start to open opportunities in less developed regions.  This, in essence, is the 
Irish model, operated at national level initially in a state that is smaller than many of the re-
gions of the rest of the EU (Bradley, 2008) 
Operating in parallel with Cohesion Policy, which is funded domestically and by Brussels, 
domestically funded social and income support transfers tend to be much larger than in-
vestment expenditures.  If there is a problem with EU Cohesion Policy, perhaps one ought to 
seek it by examining the uneasy relationship between these two kinds of regional support.  
Examining EU Cohesion Policy in isolation, at the regional level, as Boldrin and Canova, 
2001 do, almost certainly leads one to false conclusions about how states and their sub-
regions actually develop and grow, and what policies are required to assist this process. 
We believe that there are two approaches which, if developed together, hold out the possibil-
ity of more robust and insightful analysis and conclusions.   
If one is to avoid the traps of the Ederveen et al., 2006 and Boldrin and Canova, 2001 ap-
proaches – namely, a flawed analytic methodology and a misleading assertion of the null 
hypothesis - one must turn to deeper methodological approaches.  The first is the much criti-
cised one based on macroeconomic models, and is entirely in keeping with Rodrik’s sugges-
tion that “one needs to look for direct evidence about the channels through which policies are 
hypothesized to operate”.  Possibly the most promising results in this area were derived re-
cently using the new IMF GIMF model, which imposes micro foundations in a way that takes 
full account of likely deviations from more conventional assumptions of full optimizing behav-
iour in perfectly flexible markets (Kumhof and Laxton, 2008; Allard and Annett, 2008).  Much 
of the previous use of models to study Structural Funds needs to be re-examined and im-
proved in light of the advances reported in the IMF work. Summary and conclusions  18 
The second approach is a pure microeconomic one.  There is unanimous agreement on the 
need for policy intervention when the efficiency of markets is limited.  The efficiency of mar-
ket allocation can be restricted for different reasons and those situations are typically la-
belled “market failures”. One prominent type of market failure is the existence of a public 
good, since private producers will tend to undersupply such goods or services relative to the 
social optimum. As a result, it is appropriate for the government to act to ensure that such 
goods are made available.  However, a public good is just one of the many types of external-
ities which may exist. Policy interventions that try to adjust for these distortions or sources of 
market failure will inevitably be imperfect. A policy therefore has to be evaluated to see 
whether it makes the best possible correction towards efficient functioning without inducing 
undue adverse side-effects. This suggests that a useful way of approaching the evaluation of 
particular cohesion policy measures is to identify the distortion to which it is principally ad-
dressed, and to assess its performance chiefly as a correction for that distortion.  Practical 
approaches to implementing such suggestions in the context of EU Structural Funds are set 
out in Bradley et al, 2006.   
Only by looking deeper into the manner in which EU Cohesion Policy is actually designed 
and implemented, the manner in which national governments operate parallel regional poli-
cies with no reference to Brussels, and by making use of more searching and holistic models 
is it likely to be possible to deliver verdicts on whether or not the EU has a role in this impor-
tant area of integration, and if the answer is “yes”, how that policy can be modified in light of 
the recent enlargements.  Dogmatic conclusions reached in the literature, mainly negative, 
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